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OPTIMAL ABUSE OF POWER∗ 
Adrian Vermeule 
ABSTRACT—I will argue that in the administrative state, in contrast to 
classical constitutional theory, the abuse of government power is not 
something to be strictly minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative 
regime will tolerate a predictable level of misrule, even abuse of power, as 
the inevitable byproduct of attaining other ends that are desirable overall.  
There are three principal grounds for this claim. First, the architects of 
the modern administrative state were not only worried about misrule by 
governmental officials. They were equally worried about “private” 
misrule—misrule effected through the self-interested or self-serving 
behavior of economic actors wielding and abusing power under the rules of 
the 18th-century common law of property, tort, and contract. The 
administrative state thus trades off governmental and “private” misrule. 
Second, the rate of change in the policy environment, especially in the 
economy, is much greater than in the late 18th century—so much greater 
that the administrative state has been forced, willy-nilly, to speed up the 
rate of policy adjustment. The main speeding-up mechanism has been ever-
greater delegation to the executive branch, accepting the resulting risks of 
error and abuse. Third, the costs of enforcing legal rules against executive 
officials are necessarily positive and plausibly large, in part because any 
institutional monitors created to detect and punish abuses must themselves 
be monitored for abuse. 
The architects of the administrative state believed that a government 
that always forms undistorted judgments, and that never abuses its power, 
will do too little, do it too amateurishly, and do it too slowly. In that sense, 
the administrative state constantly gropes towards an institutional package 
solution that embodies an optimal level of abuse of power. 
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∗ An ancestor of this paper was presented under the title “Optimal Misrule” at a conference at 
Harvard Law School on March 3, 2014, on JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, 
ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS (2013). 
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“[I]n every political institution, a power to advance the public 
happiness involves a discretion which may be misapplied and abused.” 
—James Madison∗ 
“[L]iberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty as well as by 
the abuses of power.” 
—James Madison† 
“That power might be abused, was to persons of this opinion, a 
conclusive argument against its being bestowed; and they seemed 
firmly persuaded that the cradle of the constitution would be the grave 
of republican liberty.” 
—John Marshall‡ 
INTRODUCTION 
I hope to restate, from a somewhat different angle, my objections to a 
particular way of looking at constitutional and institutional design.1 On this 
view, which I call precautionary constitutionalism,2 the master aim of 
constitutional design is to prevent the abuse of power. Precautionary 
constitutional theory is haunted by the prospect that some official 
somewhere might commit abuses. Different strands of precautionary 
 
∗ THE FEDERALIST NO. 41, at 252 (James Madison) (Signet Classic ed., 2003). 
† Id. NO. 63, at 386 (James Madison).  
‡ 5 JOHN MARSHALL, THE LIFE OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 131 (1807). 
1 The objections are set out in ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK (2014). 
2 Id. at 27–51. 
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constitutionalism define “abuse” differently. Abuse may be defined in legal 
terms as action that flagrantly transgresses the bounds of constitutional or 
statutory authorization, or in welfare-economic terms as action that 
produces welfare losses—either because officials have ill-formed beliefs3 
or because they act with self-interested motivations. My objections apply 
equally to all these versions, so I need not specify any one of them in 
particular. 
In the modern administrative state, there are three major problems that 
undermine the precautionary view. The first and most obvious problem is 
that it is excessively costly to strictly minimize the abuse of power by 
government officials. Strict minimization is excessively costly both 
because it is expensive to set up the enforcement machinery to prevent 
abuse, such as inspectors general or criminal sanctions, and because the 
enforcement machinery will itself be staffed by officials who may abuse 
their power in turn. Given these costs, the optimal level of abuse of power 
will be greater than zero. 
The second problem is that the goal of preventing official abuse trades 
off against the goal of producing the myriad of welfare goods that the 
administrative state supplies, such as poverty relief, health, safety, 
environmentalism, and consumer protection. Insofar as constitutionalism 
takes a precautionary approach to the design of institutions, it is exposed to 
the same problems—mutatis mutandis—that bedevil precautionary 
principles in first-order regulation of environmental, health, and safety 
risks. There are substitute risks, as well as tradeoffs across and among 
risks, on all sides of the relevant institutional questions.4 
Put in general terms that cut across these policy areas, the largest 
tradeoff is that abuses of power can occur on both sides of the divide 
between “public” and “private” actions. The architects of the modern 
administrative state were not only worried about abuse of power by 
governmental officials; they were equally worried about “private” 
abuses5—abuses effected through the self-interested behavior of economic 
actors wielding delegated state power under the rules of the common law of 
property, tort, and contract, and under corporate law.6 The administrative 
 
3 By an “ill-formed belief,” I mean those beliefs that are either biased or that are of low quality, i.e., 
resting on insufficient information. 
4 See VERMEULE, supra note 1, at 58–72. 
5 See infra Part II. 
6 “Private” abuse is misleading in a familiar sense: the common law judges who make the relevant 
rules are themselves public actors, and the corporations and other economic actors who wield power 
under the rules may be seen as exercising delegated public power themselves. See, e.g., BARBARA H. 
FRIED, THE PROGRESSIVE ASSAULT ON LAISSEZ FAIRE: ROBERT HALE AND THE FIRST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS MOVEMENT 212 (1998); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-
Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923). So put, the tradeoff is between abuse by government 
officials eo nomine on the one hand, and on the other actors exercising delegated power under the 
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state thus trades off governmental and “private” abuse; it accepts increased 
risks of official abuse and distorted decisionmaking to give governmental 
officials more power to suppress “private” abuses, to increase the activity 
level of the government as a whole, and to give administrators sufficient 
information to combat the evils that arise in complex sectors of the 
economy. 
The third and final problem is that the great flowering of constitutional 
theory in the late eighteenth century addressed classical institutions, such as 
elected legislatures and constituent assemblies, whose importance has 
diminished over time.7 Our governments are, to a first approximation, 
essentially bureaucracies. The elaborate body of classical constitutional 
theory simply has little to say about bureaucracy in any form recognizable 
to us today. 
The main reason for the transformation of our government into an 
administrative state is that the rate of change in the policy environment, 
especially in the economy, is much greater than in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries—so much greater that the state has been forced, willy-
nilly, to speed up the rate of policy adjustment. And the main speeding-up 
mechanism8 has been ever-greater delegation to the executive branch, 
accepting the resulting risks of error and abuse. We inhabit a different 
environment, indeed a different world, than the classical constitutional 
theorists. One of the main differences is that, for us, time is always of the 
essence, so institutions are forced to trade off the quality of policy against 
its timeliness. 
I will put these three points together and suggest that the modern 
administrative state, centered on a bureaucratic system whose scope was 
unimaginable in the eighteenth century, has sharply qualified the very goal 
of minimizing abuses of power. In the administrative state, abuse of power 
is not something to be minimized, but rather optimized. An administrative 
regime will tolerate a predictable level of abuse of power as part of an 
optimal package solution—as the inevitable byproduct of attaining other 
ends that are desirable overall. 
Institutional design must consider margins beyond or in addition to the 
quality of beliefs that officials form and the quality of the actions officials 
choose. The architects of the administrative state believed that a 
 
common law regime—a more cumbrous formulation, which I will take to be summarized by the 
contrast between “public ” and “private” abuse.  
7 JON ELSTER, SECURITIES AGAINST MISRULE: JURIES, ASSEMBLIES, ELECTIONS 13 (2013). 
8 For the distinction between speeding-up mechanisms and slowing-down mechanisms in 
institutional design, see Jon Elster, Comments on the Paper by Ferejohn and Pasquino, 2 INT’L J. 
CONST. L. 240, 240 (2004), which notes that slowing-down mechanisms “are illustrated by devices such 
as bicameralism and time-consuming amendment procedures,” whereas speeding-up mechanisms are 
illustrated “by emergency procedures.”. 
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government that always forms undistorted judgments and always acts from 
welfare-maximizing motives, and that therefore never abuses its power, 
will do too little, do it too amateurishly, and do it too slowly. Institutional 
design in the administrative state therefore must consider the pervasive 
tradeoff between impartiality and expertise, such that more informed 
bureaucrats systematically tend to have agendas or stakes that threaten their 
impartiality; must consider the activity level or output level of 
governmental institutions; and must consider the rate of policy adjustment. 
Hence, administrative law constantly trades off the ideal of undistorted 
decisionmaking against the activity level, expertise, and speed of the 
bureaucracy. Moreover, the sheer costs of constitutional enforcement 
ensure that some positive rate of abuse is inevitable, at least in the practical 
sense that it would be unthinkable to spend the resources or to create the 
institutional structures needed to reduce official abuses to zero. Given these 
reasons, the administrative state constantly gropes toward arrangements 
that embody an optimal abuse of power. 
Part I addresses enforcement costs, Part II addresses the threat of 
private abuse of power, and Part III addresses the rate of policy adjustment. 
Part IV examines an important recent attempt by Jeremy Waldron to justify 
a classical version of the separation of powers; however, I will suggest that 
the justification must fail in the administrative state. Finally, in Part V, I 
suggest—perhaps contrary to an ambiguous discussion by Jon Elster—that 
the goal of optimizing abuse of power is a coherent one, despite our 
inevitable uncertainty about where the optimum lies. 
I. ENFORCEMENT COSTS 
Whatever the constitutional and institutional rules, the costs of 
enforcement—of preventing official abuses—will inevitably be positive. 
The problem is twofold. First and more obviously, the costs necessary to 
produce full enforcement of constitutional rules might simply not be worth 
paying, in light of other possible uses for those resources. It might take a 
large percentage of GDP to eliminate all official abuses whatsoever, 
leaving too little for the actual functioning of government and for the 
welfare goods that government supplies. I return to that issue shortly. 
Second and somewhat less obviously, eliminating abuses requires 
setting up enforcement machinery that is itself a source of possible abuses. 
In order for police officials who may abuse their powers, one must set up a 
new cadre of monitors, such as Inspectors General, prosecutors, or judges, 
or all of these, who may proceed to commit abuses in their turn. The 
resulting question, “Who guards the guardians?” has a neat answer in 
principle: The guardians must be arranged in a circle, to enable mutual 
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monitoring.9 But the necessary institutional arrangements produce costs of 
their own because the circle of mutual monitoring inevitably operates with 
a certain degree of friction, disagreement, conflict, and delay. 
The consequence is that given positive costs of enforcing 
constitutional rules, and competing uses for the relevant resources, some 
level of official abuse of power will be inevitable. In a thin second-best 
sense, this outcome will even be desirable; insofar as there is no feasible 
improvement, no alternative regime would do better. A certain level of 
abuse of power will necessarily be part of the best overall package solution 
to the problems of constitutional design. 
II. “PRIVATE” ABUSE OF POWER 
Let me turn now to a more complex issue: the abuse of power by 
nongovernmental actors, wielding delegated legal powers under general 
common law rules or under corporate law. In his 1938 Storrs Lectures,10 
James Landis argued—along the lines of Berle and Means’s 1932 
manifesto11—that increased economic interdependence and the sheer 
density of economic interactions had generated “pressure for efficiency”12 
that in turn generated massive corporations. These corporations represent 
“concentrations of power on a scale that beggars the ambitions of the 
Stuarts.”13 In spheres dominated by the lords of capital, there is an “absence 
of equal economic power”14 between corporation and individual. The 
consequence is that the “umpire theory of administering law is almost 
certain to fail. . . . [G]overnment tends to offer its aid to a claimant . . . 
because the atmosphere and conditions created by an accumulation of such 
unredressed claims is of itself a serious social threat.”15 The administrative 
state, whose defining feature is tribunals exercising active and ongoing 
supervision rather than reactive common law adjudication,16 is necessary to 
redress this imbalance of economic power. 
Conditional on creating a tribunal with active and supervisory 
regulatory jurisdiction is determining which form the tribunal should take. 
Here emerges Landis’s famous argument for the combination of powers or 
 
9 See Leonid Hurwicz, Nobel Prize Lecture: But Who Will Guard the Guardians? (Dec. 8, 2007), 
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/2007/hurwicz_
lecture.pdf [http://perma.cc/S352-D7YG]. 
10 JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). 
11 ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1932). 
12 LANDIS, supra note 10, at 46. 
13 Id. at 46.  
14 Id. at 36. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. at 22–23. 
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functions in agencies: the fusion of legislative, executive, and judicial 
powers. The eighteenth century was anxious to keep these powers apart as 
a fundamental precaution against abuse.17 Landis argues by contrast that 
“[i]f in private life we were to organize a unit for the operation of an 
industry, it would scarcely follow Montesquieu’s lines.”18 The form of the 
agency must follow the form of the concentrated entities it regulates. 
This is not simply magical thinking, although there may be a dash of 
that. Rather, the point is that the supervisory character of the agency’s role 
implies that it will be performing the same sort of tasks as the entities it 
regulates; it is thus “intelligent realism” for government to adopt a 
functionally similar form.19 The imperative is to counterbalance 
concentrated corporate power by means of expert supervisory agencies; this 
imperative dictates not only the scope of regulatory jurisdiction, but also 
the organizational form for exercising that jurisdiction. That form sharply 
qualifies a central, classical precaution against abuse—the separation of 
powers—to ensure an adequate level of information and an adequate 
activity level on the part of official bodies charged with countervailing 
private power. Although Landis is too much the politician to say this 
explicitly, the structure of the argument necessarily implies some degree of 
official blundering, even abuse of power, as the anticipated, necessary, and 
unavoidable byproduct of a level of governmental information and vigor 
that is desirable overall. 
A. Administrative Combination of Prosecutorial and  
Adjudicative Functions 
Let me offer two illustrations within contemporary administrative law: 
first, the combination of prosecutorial and adjudicative functions, and 
second, the combination of the power to make law with the power to 
interpret law. A central topic of administrative law is the combination of 
functions in bureaucracies and agencies—the brute fact, which horrifies 
separation-of-powers traditionalists,20 that agencies quite often combine the 
powers to legislate binding rules, to enforce the rules through the 
prosecution of complaints, and to adjudicate whether the rules have been 
violated.21 Shockingly, the Federal Trade Commission (to choose only one 
 
17 See, e.g., SAMUEL BRYAN, “CENTINEL,” NUMBER I (Oct. 5, 1787), reprinted in THE ANTI-
FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION DEBATES, 230 (Ralph Ketcham ed., 
Signet Classic 2003) (1986). 
18 LANDIS, supra note 10, at 10. 
19 Id. at 11–12. 
20 See Adrian Vermeule, Contra Nemo Iudex in Sua Causa: The Limits of Impartiality, 122 YALE 
L.J. 384, 404 (2012). 
21 STEPHEN G. BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 743–87 (7th ed. 
2011). 
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example) may legislate rules about unfair competition, within the bounds of 
its statutory delegation from Congress; may authorize its legal staff to file a 
complaint that alleges a violation of the rules; and then, rapidly switching 
its hat, may assume the mantle of judge and hear and decide the complaint 
that it has caused its own creatures to prosecute.22 What could possibly 
make this constitutional? What happened to venerable maxims such as, 
“No man should be judge in his own case”?23 And what of all the decisional 
distortions that such a scheme risks—most obviously, self-serving bias as 
well as the reputational cost that a decisionmaker would incur by finding 
invalid a complaint that the decisionmaker itself had put forward? 
In Withrow v. Larkin,24 the Supreme Court recognized all these 
institutional risks, yet upheld the combination of agency functions— 
essentially on the ground that the administrative state could not go on 
otherwise.25 The case involved a due process claim,26 specifically that a 
tribunal combining prosecutorial with adjudicative functions must be a 
biased tribunal, forbidden by due process. Surely, the complaining party 
said, there is an intolerable risk of biased decisionmaking when the same 
decisionmaker who lodges the charges is also the one who decides (at least 
in the first instance) whether those charges are correct.27 The pattern is 
typical for the cases; the central harm that flows from violation of the 
classical separation of functions is thought to be a distortion of 
decisionmaking. 
The Court, however, said that the principle of separation of functions, 
such as the functions of law execution and judging, was too much of a 
straitjacket to be tolerable in the administrative state: “[T]he growth, 
variety, and complexity of the administrative processes have made any one 
solution highly unlikely. . . . The incredible variety of administrative 
mechanisms in this country will not yield to any single organizing 
principle.”28 In other words, were the principle of separation of powers to 
be enforced, too much of the vast and heterogeneous administrative state 
would have to be jettisoned—an intolerable result, given everything the 
administrative state does. 
 
22 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/statutes/federal-trade-commission-act/ftc_act_incorp
oratingus_safe_web_act.pdf [http://perma.cc/GW25-5TCZ]. 
23 For a critique, see Vermeule, supra note 20, at 386–87. 
24 421 U.S. 35 (1975).  
25 Id. at 51–52, 55. 
26 Id. at 41. 
27 See id. at 47 (addressing the “contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative 
functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication”). 
28 Id. at 51–52. 
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Withrow v. Larkin built on an earlier case, FTC v. Cement Institute,29 
which had upheld a similar combination of functions in the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) itself. That case involved monopoly price-fixing in a 
regulated industry30—exactly the sort of “private” abuse of market power 
that is a central concern of the regulatory state. The regulated firms 
complained that the structure of the FTC, which combined investigative 
functions with adjudicative ones, was an affront to the separation of powers 
and to due process because of the risk of a biased tribunal.31 
With either stunning naiveté or a sophisticated faux-naiveté, the Court 
rejected the constitutional challenge on the ground that the complaining 
party’s “position, if sustained, would to a large extent defeat the 
congressional purposes which prompted passage of the Trade Commission 
Act.”32 Both expertise and activity levels were at issue. The Court went on 
to state that, as to expertise, investigation of the industry by the same 
Commissioners who would judge violations was a feature, not a bug; the 
experience gained through those investigations would be the necessary 
precondition for the Commissioners to form genuine expertise in the trade 
practices they are charged with regulating.33 As to activity levels, requiring 
a separation of prosecution from judging would disqualify the entire 
membership of the Commission with the result that “this complaint could 
not have been acted upon by the Commission or by any other government 
agency.”34 To the Court, in other words, it seemed intolerable that 
government should be forbidden to act against monopolistic distortions of 
the market—against the private abuse of power—even if the price of 
avoiding that intolerable passivity of government would be predictable 
distortions of governmental decisionmaking. 
The Constitution, then, does not generally require a separation of 
prosecution from judging. But statutes may; I have simplified the legal 
situation a bit by leaving statutes out of the analysis. In fact, the 
Administrative Procedure Act creates another layer of complication that 
illustrates how the administrative state gropes towards optimal tradeoffs 
among institutional risks.35 When the FTC’s lawyers file a formal 
complaint against a firm, the first adjudicator to decide the case will not be 
the Commission itself. Rather there will be an initial, formal adjudication 
on the record, conducted by an official called an administrative law judge 
(ALJ), with an appeal lying from that decision to the Commission itself. 
 
29 333 U.S. 683 (1948). 
30 Id. at 688. 
31 Id. at 700, 702–03. 
32 Id. at 701. 
33 Id. at 702. 
34 Id. at 701. 
35 See Administrative Procedure Act §§ 5, 7–8, 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556–57 (2012). 
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The ALJ emphatically does not combine prosecutorial functions with 
adjudicative functions, and the ALJ has no legislative rulemaking functions 
either. Rather, the Administrative Procedure Act puts into place a set of 
protections for the independence and impartiality of the ALJs, who may 
neither prosecute themselves nor be subject to the supervision of the 
prosecuting staff.36 But the Act exempts from those strictures the agency 
itself,37 meaning, in the case of the FTC, the top-level commissioners, who 
review and may reverse the decisions of the ALJs. 
Consider the odd patchwork of rules that result: Functions are 
separated at the lowest level of the agency but only for formal adjudication 
on the record, not for either informal adjudication or the agency’s 
legislative rulemaking functions. And in any event, when the case is 
appealed to the top level of the agency—the level of the commissioners 
themselves—there is no separation of functions at all. This patchwork is 
clearly an equilibrium compromise—the Supreme Court has described it as 
such38—that trades off competing considerations, involving the risks of 
biased decisionmaking on the one hand and the risks of insufficient activity 
levels and expertise on the other. It seems unlikely that the compromise is 
optimal in any strong sense, but historically it was designed to protect 
multiple values, each to some degree but none fully, and in that weaker 
sense has an optimizing character. 
B. Administrative Combination of Lawmaking and Law-Interpretation 
So far I have discussed the combination of prosecutorial with 
adjudicative functions, but there is also the recurring issue of the 
combination of lawmaking with law-interpretation. Agencies often do both 
things, to the horror of separation-of-powers devotees. Here, the classical 
worry about abuse of power is not so much a worry about cognitive 
distortion as it is about motivational distortion: A decisionmaker that 
knows it will have license to interpret the very same laws it creates will 
have incentives to write vague laws in order to maximize its own 
interpretive discretion farther downstream.39 
The modern Supreme Court, however, largely ignores this concern. In 
fact, it not only allows agencies to interpret the legislative rules they 
themselves create, but also holds that judges have to defer to the agencies 
 
36 Id. § 554(d). 
37 Id. § 554(d)(2)(C). 
38 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40–41 (1950). 
39 This is a Lockean theme. See JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER 
CONCERNING TOLERATION 138–41 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690); JEAN-JACQUES 
ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 180, 213–15 (J.H. Brumfitt & John C. Hall eds., 
G.D.H. Cole trans., 1993) (1762). 
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about what those rules mean.40 The Court has held this because it believes 
that agencies have special expertise about the meaning of the rules they 
themselves have created, and—even more importantly—because 
interpretation is not cleanly separable from policymaking, so that the power 
to interpret the rules is a necessary component of the agency’s 
policymaking expertise with respect to the given problem or industry. 
This is essentially to accept a tradeoff. The Court has never said that 
the motivational distortion posited by the classical separation of powers is 
not a real one; instead, what the Court seems to think is that the costs of 
distorted incentives are worth paying in light of the benefits to 
policymaking by expert agencies. In other words, a certain risk of abuse is 
tolerable in the service of overall institutional gains. 
III. THE RATE OF POLICY ADJUSTMENT OVER TIME 
I turn now to the third principal point, the rate of policy adjustment 
over time. Holding constant the institutional variables we have already 
discussed, there is a separate question about the rate at which governmental 
policy adjusts over time, as the rate of change in the economic and policy 
environment itself changes. Here I follow William Scheuerman’s insight41 
that the engine of the administrative state is the increasing rate of change in 
the policy environment, relative to any baseline we choose. That is, the rate 
of change in the economy, technology, and so on, was plausibly greater in 
2000 than in 1900, and greater in 1900 than in 1800.42 
Legislative institutions are structurally incapable of supplying policy 
change at the necessary rates, a point made by students of constitutional 
law as radically dissimilar as Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone43 and Carl 
 
40 Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997); Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410 
(1945). In recent years, Justice Scalia has questioned the validity of Auer deference. See Decker v. Nw. 
Envtl. Def. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1339 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
However, in Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015), six Justices—Roberts, 
Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Kagan, and Sotomayor—signed an opinion that reaffirmed Auer deference 
and that said arbitrary and capricious review under the APA is the right vehicle for addressing concerns 
with the interests of regulated parties. See 135 S. Ct. at 1208–09 & n.4. Justices Scalia and Thomas 
concurred separately to criticize Auer deference, see id. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 1213 
(Thomas, J., concurring). At least for the time being, a clear supermajority of the Court thinks the Auer 
approach is correct.    
41 WILLIAM E. SCHEUERMAN, LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND THE SOCIAL ACCELERATION OF TIME 
passim (2004). 
42 See id. at 1–9. 
43 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944) (Stone, C.J.) (upholding delegation of price-
control authority to administrative agency, on the ground that “[t]he Constitution as a continuously 
operative charter of government does not demand the impossible or the impracticable [and] does not 
require that Congress find for itself every fact upon which it desires to base legislative action or that it 
make for itself detailed determinations which it has declared to be prerequisite to the application of the 
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Schmitt.44 The veto-gates; second, third, and nth opinions;45 and interbranch 
checks and balances that, in a Madisonian system, are intended to promote 
reasoned deliberation, and launder out passion and interest, together ensure 
that legislatures will “come too late”46 to the resolution of an increasing 
fraction of policy problems. To some extent, legislatures may solve the 
problem by internal specialization, through an ever-more-elaborate 
committee system and an ever-larger staff. But there is an upper bound to 
the capacity of legislative institutions to do this; the constraint arises from 
the increasing complexity of legislative institutions as they are scaled up, 
and the increasing transaction costs of conducting legislative business. The 
U.S. Congress has gone about as far as it is possible to go in this regard, 
with its 20,000-odd employees and staff, dozens of principal committees, 
and more than a gross of subcommittees.47 Even so, Congress’s agenda is 
so radically compacted and constrained that it is routine for critical policy 
problems to languish indefinitely on the congressional docket even as 
extant law becomes risibly maladapted to the relevant problems as the 
policy environment changes over time.48   
Under the pressure of necessity, three institutional developments occur 
in parallel. First, Congress’s main response to the increasing rate of change 
in the policy environment is ever-increasing delegation to the executive 
branch and independent agencies. Second, courts defer ever more strongly 
to agencies, who are better positioned than courts to update policy under 
obsolete statutes in a world in which Congress has increasingly abdicated 
its policy responsibilities.49 And, third, the executive itself expands its own 
power of unilateral action,50 exploiting broad and vague delegations, vague 
 
legislative policy to particular facts and circumstances impossible for Congress itself properly to 
investigate”). 
44 CARL SCHMITT, THE CRISIS OF PARLIAMENTARY DEMOCRACY 48–50 (Ellen Kennedy trans., 
MIT Press 1985) (1923); William E. Scheuerman, The Economic State of Emergency, 21 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1869, 1870, 1887 (2000). 
45 On second opinions in institutional design, see ADRIAN VERMEULE, THE CONSTITUTION OF RISK 
141–62 (2014). 
46 See Scheuerman, supra note 45, at 1887. 
47 As of 2001, there were about 200 committees and 23,000 congressional staff of all types. See 
Norman J. Orstein et al., Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ch. 4 at tbl.4-1, ch. 5 at 
tbl.5-1, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/07/vital-statistics-congress-mann-ornstein 
[http://perma.cc/KR4H-CLMS]. 
48 Consider that administrative regulation of carbon emissions and climate change is proceeding 
under a statute, the Clean Air Act, written in the 1970s to address different problems altogether. See 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007); Jody Freeman & David Spence, Old Statutes, New 
Problems, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (2014). 
49 See Freeman & Spence, supra note 49; Cass R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative 
Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J. 1013, 1049–50, 1053, 1056 (1998). 
50 Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The Presidential Power of Unilateral Action, 15 J.L. ECON. 
& ORG. 132 (1999). 
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constitutional powers, and traditional pockets of discretion, such as power 
over prosecution and enforcement, in order to change policies without 
going to Congress for statutory authorization. 
Constitutional law’s main response to these developments, after an 
initial period of resistance, has been to get out of the way. In the United 
States, judicial resistance to delegation began in earnest in 193551 and 
ended, at the latest, in 1944.52 Judicial deference to agency interpretations 
of law is not constitutionally problematic. The reigning justification, 
however fictional it may be, is that Congress itself intends for such 
deference to occur.53 Similarly, unilateral presidential action has 
occasionally been invalidated,54 but for the most part it has become the 
routine stuff of government in the United States. Consider that President 
Obama, having failed to obtain a liberalization of the immigration laws 
from Congress (the “DREAM Act”), instituted roughly the same policy 
merely by announcing a very broad policy of deliberate nonenforcement of 
the extant immigration statutes.55 
The cause or consequence of all this is a tradeoff. In a simple model, 
broader and looser delegation, with fewer veto-gates in the lawmaking 
process, allows the executive to put new beneficial policies in place more 
easily, while also allowing more expropriation—more abuse of delegated 
power.56 As the rate of change in the policy environment increases, the 
benefits of loosening the constraints on new executive action increase, 
despite the greater risk of abuse. The basic approach is to justify abuses of 
power as the unavoidable byproduct of a package solution that is 
increasingly desirable overall as the rate of policy change increases. 
The point is fractal; it holds in the same form at whatever scale we 
examine the administrative state. Once delegating statutes are in place, the 
law faces the question of how costly it should be for agencies to adjust or 
 
51 See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. 
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–38 (1935). 
52 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944). For a sweeping recent restatement of 
congressional power to delegate, see Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472–76 
(2001). 
53 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227–30 (2001). 
54 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
55 Alejandro Mayorkas, Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals: Who Can be Considered, THE 
WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Aug. 15, 2012, 11:55 AM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/
08/15/deferred-action-childhood-arrivals-who-can-be-considered [http://perma.cc/Q83C-LMEJ]; Brad 
Plumer, Can Obama Legalize 11 Million Immigrants on His Own?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Nov. 14, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/11/14/can-obama-legalize-11-million
-immigrants-on-his-own/ [http://perma.cc/3BMG-E4RF]; Letter from Law Professors to President 
Barack Obama (May 28, 2012) (available at http://www.law.uh.edu/ihelg/documents/Executive
AuthorityForDREAMRelief28May2012withSignatures.pdf [http://perma.cc/V7Q3-9WSH]).  
56 Philippe Aghion et al., Endogenous Political Institutions, 119 Q.J. ECON. 565, 570 (2004). 
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update policies within the scope of their delegated authority. Beginning in 
the 1960s and through the 1980s, judges pioneered a form of scrutiny of 
administrative action called hard look review, under which courts would 
examine the justifications agencies offered for their policy choices, 
assessing both the procedural rationality and the substantive plausibility of 
those justifications.57 Critics complained that hard look review resulted in 
“ossification,” or excessive legal drag on agencies’ ability to update 
policies with changing circumstances.58 
Empirically, it isn’t clear that ossification is a real problem.59 
Nonetheless, in recent years, the Supreme Court has courageously dealt this 
possibly imaginary problem several powerful blows through decisions that 
in effect reduce legal constraints on agencies’ ability to update policies 
over time—even if the result is that agency policymaking is less reasoned 
and more arbitrary.60 An example is Federal Communications Commission 
v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,61 in which the Commission moved to a 
new, more restrictive set of rules governing broadcasting of expletives or 
indecent content. The problem (in stylized form) was that although the 
Commission had given a set of reasons to justify the new policy, it had not 
given any reasons to think that the new policy was better than the old one.62 
The Court, however, held that the law’s ban on “arbitrary” and “capricious” 
decisionmaking by agencies63 was not violated by failure to compare past 
 
57 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 52 
(1983); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420–21 (1971). 
58 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 
363, 382–84 (1986); Thomas O. McGarity, The Courts and the Ossification of Rulemaking: A Response 
to Professor Seidenfeld, 75 TEX. L. REV. 525 (1997); Note, Rationalizing Hard Look Review After the 
Fact, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1909 (2009). 
59 There is a growing literature. See, e.g., William S. Jordan, III, Ossification Revisited: Does 
Arbitrary and Capricious Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory 
Goals Through Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393 (2000); Anne Joseph O’Connell, 
Political Cycles of Rulemaking: An Empirical Portrait of the Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 889, 963–66 (2008); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Administrative Procedures and 
Bureaucratic Performance: Is Federal Rule-Making “Ossified”?, 20 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 
261 (2010); Jason Webb Yackee & Susan Webb Yackee, Testing the Ossification Thesis: An Empirical 
Examination of Federal Regulatory Volume and Speed, 1950–1990, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1414 
(2012). 
60 In addition to the example in text, see, e.g., National Cable & Telecommuncations Association v. 
Brand X Internet Services, 545 U.S. 967, 1002–03 (2005), which allowed agencies to change their 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes over time, even if doing so effectively nullifies a preexisting 
judicial decision. 
61 556 U.S. 502, 529–30 (2009). 
62 Id. at 514–15 (finding that the reasons for the new policy need not be better than those reasons 
for the old one).  
63 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).  
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and present policies; all that the agency had to give was a good reason for 
its current position.64 
Now this is not obviously consistent with agencies’ fundamental 
obligation to make reasoned decisions. At least in static contexts, where the 
options do not change over time, and where the costs and benefits of the 
options are known (at least in expectation), comparative policy evaluation 
seems a minimum necessary condition of rationality. In this sort of static 
context, “satisficing”—settling for something good enough65—is irrational; 
why not pick the best option, the one with the highest expected value? If 
the value of the options is known, at least in expectation, it is irrational to 
say, “I have good reasons to pick A, so it doesn’t matter that B is even 
better.”66 
To be sure, in Fox Television itself, the policy context of the case at 
hand involved uncertainty, and under uncertainty satisficing can be a 
rational approach.67 Agencies frequently operate in uncertain, dynamic 
environments in which search for the best policy is costly and must 
somehow be truncated. Satisficing is one way to do so. But the problem is 
that the Court’s opinion is completely insensitive to these distinctions; Fox 
does not limit its holding in this way. 
A more convincing account of Fox Television is that the Court was 
worried about granting a new license for ossification. Allowing parties to 
force agencies to perform comparative policy evaluation, on pain of 
judicial reversal, would allow regulated actors to delay agency action 
through harassing litigation, thereby gumming up the works even more 
than already occurs. Allowing agencies to satisfice, even in contexts where 
satisficing is not obviously a rational course, removes one margin—the 
margin of comparative policy evaluation—on which regulated entities may 
press in order to thwart and delay the course of policymaking. The tradeoff, 
in other words, is that the Court is willing to accept a degree of irrational 
satisficing in agency decisionmaking in the interest of unclogging the 
channels of administrative change. In the real institutional setting of the 
administrative state, a requirement of fully rational decisionmaking by 
officials may be exploited by self-interested private groups for socially 
harmful ends. Thus the tradeoff between the rationality of policymaking 
 
64 Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515 ([I]t suffices that the new policy is permissible under the statute, 
that there are good reasons for it, and that the agency believes it to be better . . . .”). 
65 MICHAEL SLOTE, BEYOND OPTIMIZING: A STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 8–20 (1989); Herbert A. 
Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955).  
66 David Schmidtz, Satisficing as a Humanly Rational Strategy, in SATISFICING AND MAXIMIZING: 
MORAL THEORISTS ON PRACTICAL REASON 30, 39–40 (Michael Byron ed., 2004). 
67 Simon, supra note 66, at 115–18, emphasizes that satisficing is a rational strategy in dynamic 
environments, in which the decisionmaker must place limits on the search for new options or new 
information about options. 
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and its speed is, in part, another instance of the tradeoff between “public” 
and “private” abuse of power that is so fundamental to the administrative 
state. 
IV. WALDRON ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND  
THE SEPARATION OF FUNCTIONS 
I have suggested that the separation of powers has been deeply 
compromised by the administrative state, and for good reasons. However, 
not everyone agrees that this compromise is desirable. Jeremy Waldron 
offers us a late flower of classical constitutional thought—a deeply 
considered parsing of the notion of separation of powers, one that aims to 
distinguish it from neighboring notions like checks and balances, and to 
isolate and identify its inherent value.68 Waldron’s argument is not 
precautionary. His point is not that the separation of powers is a useful 
prophylactic against the abuse of power. Nonetheless his argument must be 
addressed, because if it is correct, then the separation of powers has a 
special inherent value that ought not to be tossed into the soup of 
institutional tradeoffs. But I think that his argument is incorrect, and indeed 
that it is idolatrous; it makes the classical separation of powers into an 
implacable idol, deaf to all other considerations and to all other goods. 
A. Waldron’s Argument 
Waldron acknowledges that the separation of powers may not, at least 
in the United States, have the status of an enforceable legal norm.69 The 
Constitution’s text does not mention it as such, and it is hardly obvious that 
a freestanding principle of the separation of powers may validly be inferred 
from the larger constitutional structure.70 But Waldron rightly observes that 
even if the separation of powers lacks legal force, it may still have force as 
a principle of our constitutional culture—a political ideal in the high 
constitutional sense.71 
The principle of separation of powers, Waldron argues, has value that 
is conceptually distinct from the values underpinning checks and balances, 
the division of powers, or even the rule of law. The value underpinning 
separation of powers is respect for “the character and distinctiveness of 
each of the three main functions of government.”72 Rather than collapse all 
 
68 See Jeremy Waldron, Separation of Powers in Thought and Practice?, 54 B.C. L. REV. 433, 
460–62 (2013). 
69 Id. at 435–38. 
70 John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 
1944–45 (2011). 
71 Waldron, supra note 69, at 436–37. 
72 Id. at 466. 
109:673 (2015) Optimal Abuse of Power 
689 
official decisionmaking into an undifferentiated mass, as in the dictates of a 
khadi or monarch, it is desirable that there should be “articulated 
government through successive phases of governance each of which 
maintains its own integrity . . . .”73 Power must flow through differentiated 
institutions: “The legislature, the judiciary, and the executive—each must 
have its separate say before power impacts on the individual.”74 
B. Waldron’s Argument as Tautology 
Why isn’t Waldron’s argument tautological? To say that powers 
should be separated because there is a value to institutions with 
differentiated and distinctive powers having a “separate say”—isn’t this 
just equivalent to saying, in circular fashion, that powers should be 
separated because there is a value to the separation? Waldron does not 
appeal to the functional consequences of such differentiation; his argument 
is not that (or is only incidentally that) separating powers produces 
institutional benefits, such as slower or better decisions. That sort of 
justification would implicate the countervailing considerations and 
tradeoffs I have detailed. Rather, Waldron is looking for something more 
conceptual, more enduring. He speaks in the language of the sacred, the 
language of “integrity” and “contamination.” 
The Separation of Powers Principle holds that these respective tasks have, 
each of them, an integrity of their own, which is contaminated when executive 
or judicial considerations affect the way in which legislation is carried out, 
which is contaminated when legislative and executive considerations affect 
the way the judicial function is performed, and which is contaminated when 
the tasks specific to the executive are tangled up with the tasks of law-making 
and adjudication.75 
The idea seems to be that functionally separated decisionmaking has an 
intrinsic or inherent value from the standpoint of political morality. But it is 
not clear that Waldron has identified any such value in terms that are 
distinct from merely describing the separation itself. Furthermore, it is not 
obvious that what are, after all, merely institutional arrangements—whose 
value is heavily dependent upon contingent circumstances of time and 
place—could ever be the sorts of things that could be “contaminated,” even 
in principle. The language of the sacred is simply misplaced as to matters 
of institutional design. Waldron has made a particular, highly contingent 
institutional pattern—the classical separation of powers—into a kind of 
idol whose commands trump any other consideration. 
 
73 Id. at 467. 
74 Id. at 459. 
75 Id. at 460. 
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C. A Self-Defeating Argument 
Let us put all this aside, however. Suppose that Waldron’s justification 
manages to avoid tautology. An entirely separate question is the level at 
which the justification is supposed to operate. For clarity, let us refer to the 
separation of powers at the constitutional level and the separation of 
functions at the administrative level. 
In the administrative state, the great bulk of rulemaking is 
accomplished by legislative delegation of power to agencies, which then 
make rules while exercising combined functions. Waldron clearly wants to 
condemn this in principle,76 but it is not obvious that it should pose any 
problem for him. If the delegating statute itself has been deliberated by the 
legislature, approved by the executive, and reviewed for constitutionality 
by the judiciary, why hasn’t the force of the separation of powers principle 
at the constitutional level been entirely exhausted? When the agency then 
exercises its (combined) functions as authorized by that statute, it is true 
that “[t]he legislature, the judiciary, and the executive—each [has had] its 
separate say before power impacts on the individual.”77 It is unclear, then, 
why Waldron should object to delegation of power to agencies or to the 
agencies’ exercise of combined functions under a delegation. 
It is not as though the issue is novel. The Justices, to their credit, 
considered these issues long ago, in the second round of the epic and 
defining litigation, SEC v. Chenery Corp.78—what administrative lawyers 
call Chenery II. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), through 
adjudication, formulated an administrative order and applied it to the 
parties at hand, rejecting their proposal for a corporate reorganization as 
inconsistent with a general statutory requirement of “fair and equitable” 
action. Justice Jackson, taking Waldron’s part in dissent, protested 
vehemently against the “retroactivity” of the Commission’s approach. In 
Justice Jackson’s view, rather than applying its order to the parties in the 
case at hand, the Commission ought to have first formulated a legislative-
type rule applying solely prospectively, and only then proceeded to enforce 
it and adjudicate future violations. (This would have required letting the 
inequity in the case at hand go unredressed.) Justice Jackson, in other 
words, objected to the agency as Sultan—to the mushing together of 
rulemaking, law execution, and adjudication in the same decision. In that 
Waldron-esque sense, he argued for separation of functions at the agency 
level, not merely separation of powers at the level of Congress, the 
President, and the judiciary. 
 
76 Id. at 464–65. 
77 Id. at 459. 
78 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).  
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Waldron clearly wants this as well.79 But the Chenery II Court thought 
that Justice Jackson’s dissent, which no other Justice joined, was 
overheated—inebriated by an excessive intake of principle. Although the 
Court agreed that “quasi-legislative promulgation” of prospective rules 
should occur “as much as possible,” it rejected any “rigid requirement” to 
that effect.80 Instead, the Court offered a famously nuanced and level-
headed analysis of the circumstances under which separation of functions, 
and Waldron’s preferred sequence of general rulemaking followed by 
specific application, might actually make impossible the execution of the 
very delegation with which the agency had been entrusted: 
[P]roblems may arise in a case which the administrative agency could not 
reasonably foresee, problems which must be solved despite the absence of a 
relevant general rule. Or the agency may not have had sufficient experience 
with a particular problem to warrant rigidifying its tentative judgment into a 
hard and fast rule. Or the problem may be so specialized and varying in nature 
as to be impossible of capture within the boundaries of a general rule. In those 
situations, the agency must retain power to deal with the problems on a case-
to-case basis if the administrative process is to be effective. There is thus a 
very definite place for the case-by-case evolution of statutory standards. And 
the choice made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc 
litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the 
administrative agency.81 
 The sentence I have emphasized explains the problem with holding 
that separation of functions is required at the administrative level. At the 
higher level of statutory lawmaking, Congress, the President, and the 
judiciary have engaged in just the sort of reticulated, deliberative 
lawmaking process that Waldron wants; after due constitutional 
deliberation, they have converged on a policy and have decided that the 
agency is best positioned to implement it. That decision—which must itself 
have unimpeachable credentials, in Waldron’s view—will be thwarted if 
there must also be rigid separation of functions at the level of the agency. 
As the Court argued, the implementing agency would then lack the 
flexibility needed to carry out the instructions given to it by the highly 
reticulated, Waldron-esque process of sequential lawmaking. Two levels of 
separation is a pragmatically inconsistent arrangement, on Waldron’s own 
premises. In this sense, Waldron’s argument is self-defeating. 
The point is emphatically not that pragmatics override principle. 
Rather the separation of functions at the second, lower level has to give 
way precisely in order that the principled, properly differentiated decisions 
 
79 Waldron, supra note 69, at 463–66. 
80 Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 202. 
81 Id. at 202–03 (citing Columbia Broad. Sys. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 421 (1942)) 
(emphasis added).  
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reached at the higher level of statutory enactment and delegation may be 
given real life. In that sense, the administrative state must partially jettison 
the separation of administrative functions in order to carry out the larger 
purposes of the separation of powers. The form and the function of 
separation of powers trade off against one another at higher and lower 
levels, and some sort of compromise—ideally an optimal compromise—
must be effected between them. The Administrative Procedure Act and the 
rules of administrative law, which give agencies a great deal of latitude to 
combine functions, are best viewed as an effort to achieve an optimal 
compromise of this kind. 
V. OPTIMAL ABUSE OF POWER? 
Finally, let me tie up a loose end. I have been casually throwing 
around the phrase “optimal abuse of power.” How much conceptual and 
philosophical baggage is stuffed inside that phrase? In my view, not very 
much. There is a pragmatic construal that makes perfect sense of 
optimization in the constitutional and administrative setting, a construal 
that fully recognizes the practical and epistemic difficulties that arise from 
grave uncertainty about where the optimum may lie. 
To focus the issues, let me quote a brief discussion of optimizing 
institutional design by Jon Elster. Elster’s view is skeptical, but—I 
believe—gives me everything I need to make the sort of claims I have 
advanced here. Elster says the following: 
[C]iting the need to find an “optimal compromise” between, say, expertise and 
impartiality is to presuppose that we can determine the trade-off between these 
two values. One might affirm, for instance, that the benefits from learning 
created by extending the tenure of rotating officials from one year to two years 
exceed the costs arising from the risk of capture. Similarly, one might affirm 
that the benefits of a two-terms-only rule for deputies exceed the costs. It 
follows from my general argument, however, that such claims will in general 
be unsustainable. They assume that we have a normative theory of what 
constitutes a good outcome and a causal theory of how to bring it about by 
institutional means. The present work as a whole is directed against this 
assumption. 
 This being said, it would be absurd to be dogmatic on this issue. In some 
cases where a proposed reform would entail costs as well as benefits, one can 
confidently claim that the net effect will be positive. Examples include the 
abolition of life tenure for judges (an American practice created when life 
expectancies were less than half of what they are today) or of annual elections 
to Parliament (also a practice that may have made sense in the 18th century 
but not in the 21st). By contrast, the merits of triennial versus quadrennial 
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elections or of six-year versus eight-year tenure for judges on constitutional 
courts seem entirely indeterminate.82 
Elster here lays out all I need to motivate the thin and undemanding sense 
of optimality that I use. If cases exist in which we can be confident that the 
net benefits of an institutional reform would be positive, then we must have 
some common currency or metric—call it “welfare” if you like—by which 
to compare the costs and the benefits. Moreover, sometimes (not always or 
necessarily) we will have a sense of the sign of moves from the status 
quo—that is, whether we are moving in the right direction or the wrong 
direction within the space of possible institutional designs, where “the right 
direction” is toward the point at which no further net-beneficial moves will 
be possible. But if and when we have a sense of those things, there is 
nothing incoherent about calling ourselves “optimizers” in the following 
thin sense: We keep making incremental net-beneficial moves within the 
institutional space just up until the point at which the net benefits from 
further moves have diminished to zero—to the point where marginal 
benefits and costs are equal, or roughly equal as far as we can tell. 
True, we might well run out of information at some point. It might just 
be irreducibly unclear whether another small move in the institutional 
space will produce incremental net benefits. Moreover, even if we are 
confident that further small moves will indeed produce no more net 
benefits, that might just mean that we have arrived at a local maximum, a 
local peak of welfare, rather than a global maximum, the highest peak or 
“optimum” in a strong sense.83 If so, then small moves might not help, but 
large leaps would, if only we knew which way to leap. 
To pursue Elster’s example, faced with a tradeoff between impartiality 
and expertise, suppose we fiddle with the length of officials’ terms or the 
frequency of elections in the search for net benefits. We might encounter a 
wall of uncertainty, a veil of ignorance, such that we have no idea whether 
another change to the official term or some other fiddle in the same 
direction is a good idea. More seriously, even if we come to rest, thinking 
we have reached a peak, the true global optimum might actually be reached 
by a large leap—perhaps switching to a radically different system for 
selecting officials altogether, such as the system of selection by lot used in 
the ancient city-states. Who knows? 
But none of this is to deny the coherence of the optimizing enterprise. 
It is just to say that optimizing under conditions of uncertainty is difficult. 
The problem is informational, not conceptual. The optimizing approach is 
pragmatic, contingent, and epistemic. If we think we can make incremental 
 
82 ELSTER, supra note 7, at 13. 
83 For the local-maximum problem, see JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS 
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improving moves from wherever we happen to start, then we are aiming for 
some optimum while acknowledging that under uncertainty we may never 
quite know when or if we have arrived. 
CONCLUSION 
The administrative state faces inevitable tradeoffs among the classical 
institutional goal of reducing official abuse of power, the presence of 
positive costs of enforcing the constitutional rules, the regulatory goal of 
reducing private abuse of power, and a myriad of substantive welfarist 
goals. Its response—by fits and starts, and with all sorts of crosscutting 
political agendas and compromises—has been to grope towards a set of 
arrangements that tolerate a certain amount of official abuse as the 
unavoidable byproduct of a package solution that achieves the other aims 
of the administrative state. One does not know, of course, whether the rules 
of the administrative state are optimal in the strong sense that they reach a 
global welfare maximum. But there is no doubt that the architects of the 
administrative state were, in some cases anyway, searching for net 
institutional improvements in the face of the relevant tradeoffs, and thus 
intentionally optimizing—albeit locally, in my weak sense. “Optimal abuse 
of power,” then, is just shorthand for the distance we have had to travel 
away from the classical ideal of precautionary constitutional arrangements 
that strictly minimize the risks of bad government by public officials. 
 
